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THE GOALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE RANGE OF 
ENFORCEMENT METHODS IN ISRAEL AND IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
MARCIA GELPE* 
I. Introduction 
Many different types of enforcement actions may be taken against those 
who violate environmental laws. This article describes a variety of methods 
of enforcing environmental laws, evaluates each one, and recommends 
changes in the enforcement provisions of Israeli environmental laws. 
The article examines enforcement of the environmental laws of Israel and 
of the United States. It concentrates on provisions for enforcement of the 
laws by government authorities - that is, either by administrative authorities 
or by the courts at the request of an administrative authority. Environmental 
laws in many jurisdictions may also be enforced by private actions.! These 
private enforcement actions are not addressed specifically in this article, 
although much of what is said is also applicable to such actions. Also beyond 
the scope of this article are permits and other arrangements for implementa-
* Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, S1. Paul, Minnesota, U.S.A.; Professor, 
Netanya Academic College, Netanya, Israel. 
See,jor example, in Israel, Water Law § 20Y (1959),1993 Isc Bovt!' Legis. D~2, D~14; 
Prevention of Environmental Nuisances (Actions by Citizens) Law (1992), 1993 Isr. 
Eovt!. Legis. B~I3. In the United States, see Clean Air Act § 304, 42 V.S.C.A. § 7604 
(West 1995); Clean Water Ac! § 50S. 33 V.S.C.A. § 1365 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West 1995); Toxic 
Substances Control Act, IS V.S.C.A. § 2619 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997). The fact that 
many environmental laws arc enforceable by private action blurs the distinction between 
private civil-punitive law and public civil-punitive law, as noted by Professor Mann. K. 
Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions, 16 Tel Aviv U. L. Rev. 243 (1991) (Hebrew). In fact, in 
Israel, where private parties may seek criminal sanctions under a number of laws, the 
entire criminal-civil distinction is somewhat blurred. 
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tion of the requirements of environmental laws. Although permits could be 
considered part of the enforcement system insofar as they are used to achieve 
compliance, they are not covered here. This article deals with enforcement 
only in the sense of actions taken against parties who have violated the 
requirements of environmental laws. Permits, on the other hand, affect 
compliance mainly by preventing violations before they occur. 
Finally, this article does not consider compensatory remedies, even though 
they may have the effect of a means of enforcement. If a person who violates 
environmental laws must pay compensation for personal, property, and 
natural resource injuries, some of the effects upon the behavior of that 
person may be similar to those of penalties, particularly civil and administra-
tive penalties. This article addresses only more direct means of enforcement. 
The nature of the requirements of the law is not relevant for the purposes 
of this article. It is of no consequence whether the law requires 0 bservance of 
a certain emission standard, or payment of an effluent charge, or reporting 
of a discharge. Nor does it matter whether the requirement is in a statute, a 
regulation, a permit, or in another document given legal force by the 
applicable law. In all cases, if a party violates a legal requirement, the 
question arises as to what is to be done about the violator - which method 
of enforcement should be used. 
II. Evaluating Methods of Enforcement 
Each method of enforcing environmental laws is evaluated based on the 
criteria of efficacy, workability, substantive fairness, and procedural fairness. 
"Efficacy" refers to how successful a particular enforcement action is in 
reaching its goal. For example, one goal of enforcement is to deter future 
violations by third parties. Enforcement by some means, such as a criminal 
fine, is efficacious if it actually deters others from violating the law. 
Workability refers to whether the enforcement method will be used by the 
government authority that is responsible for enforcing the law. An enforce-
ment method is not workable if there is some practical barrier, such as high 
administrative costs, to its utilization. 
Substantive fairness relates to whether there is a fair proportionality 
between the severity of the sanction imposed and the seriousness of the 
violation. Procedural fairness addresses the issue of whether the procedures 
used for imposing the sanction give sufficient protection to the alleged 
violator. 
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Each one of the last three standards of evaluation is fairly clear in itself. 
The first, efficacy, requires further elaboration. 
III. Efficacy and the Goals of Environmental Enforcement 
I. Goals of Environmental Laws 
In order to identify the goals of environmental enforcement, it is necessary 
first to identify the general goals of the environmental laws themselves. 
Commentators describe two views of environmental laws.2 One view is 
that they proscribe pollution because it is inherently bad: it is harmful to 
health and to society. Violation of the laws is deemed immoral behavior.' 
Under this view, those who violate environmental legal norms are just like 
any other criminal. 
The second view posits that environmental laws limit activity that would 
not occur if the market worked properly in regard to polluting activities. 
Market defects lead polluters to engage in activities that cause harm to the 
environment. As the extensive literature shows, we overuse the air, water, 
and land as waste dumps because we do not have to pay the full cost of using 
these common resources.' Environmental laws provide a substitute for the 
payments the market would demand if it set a price for use of common 
resources. While the substitute set in the laws could be in the form of a charge 
for use of these resources, it is most commonly a standard that limits the 
amonnt of permissible discharges. The source must then meet the standard 
instead of paying the cost of using the resource. Under this view, the law does 
not define or proscribe activity that is immoral, but, rather, only tries to 
assure the allocation of resources that would be achieved in a well-functioning 
market. If this is achieved, the properlevel of environmental protection will 
be provided. 
2 See Project: The Decriminalization of Administrative Law Penalties: Civil Remedies, 
Alternatives, Policy, and Conslilutionallmplications, 45 Ad, L. Rev. 367, 371-72 (L.J. 
Kerrigan ed., 1993) (hereinafter Decriminalization). 1.1. Charney, The Need/or Consti* 
tutional Proteclionsjor Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 478, 496 
(1974). . 
3 See Charney, supra note 2, at 496. 
4 The discharger does not have to pay the full cost because of the common nature of the 
resource into which the discharge is made (see, e.g., Garrett Hardin's classic essay, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. J243 (1968)), because of the lack of information on the 
effects of the discharge, and because of the inadequacy of the tort system as a means of 
forcing the discharger to internalize the costs that the discharge imposes on others. 
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It is not necessary to debate here which of these two goals, definition of 
bad behavior or correction of a market defect, is most essential to environ-
mental regulation. Clearly both are goals of the environmental laws currently 
in force. 
2. Goals of Environmental Enforcement 
How we define the purpose of environmental law influences how we view 
enforcement of these laws. To the extent that we define the objective as 
setting out unacceptable norms of behavior, the goals of enforcement are the 
traditional goals of criminal punishment: retribution - "the deserved inflic-
tion of suffering on evildoers";' specific deterrence -.- deterring the violator 
from repeating the violation; general deterrence - deterring others from 
violating the legal norm; incapacitation; and rehabilitation. 6 
Some comments on general deterrence in environmental law would be 
helpful in understanding concepts presented below. The theory of general 
deterrence posits that a sanction imposed on one person deters another from 
violating because the second person takes into account the possibility that 
the sanction will be imposed on him before he commits the violation. If the 
sanction appears serious enough, the second person will be dissuaded from 
committing the violation. 
This theory assumes that the potential violator considers the possible 
sanction before committing the violation. This assumption is probably valid 
for a great many violations of the environmental laws, which are designed to 
control the behavior of organizations (corporations or governmental units). 
These laws address planned activity, not impulsive actions.' 
Some environmental laws, such as laws against littering, do address 
individual, more impulsive activity. For these laws, Packer's theory of the 
second way in which general deterrence functions is more apt. Packer tells us 
that the calculated consideration of sanction is less important than the role 
5 H.L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 36 (\968). 
6 [d., at 35-61. 
7 As Packer points out, this is a very rationalist model of how general deterrence works and 
has been rejected or modified by fome, Packer, supra note 5, at 40-45. The rationalist 
model is probably morc applicable to environmental laws that govern behavior of 
organizations (corporations and governments) than it is to traditional criminal laws. On 
the other hand, the rationalist model is probably less valid for some environmental 
violations, especially those committed by individuals, such as littering. In the latter type 
of cases, Packer's observation that general deterrence may work by creating general 
societal norms of behavior is more relevant. Packer, supra note 5, at 43-45. 
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of the law in creating general societal norms of behavior that will influence 
the actor in more subtle ways.8 
In either case, the degree of deterrence also depends on the size of the 
sanction and the probability that it will be imposed. If the probability of 
imposition of the sanction increases, the same deterrent effect can be achieved 
through a smaller sanction, so long as the sanction remains greater than the 
gain to be had from the violation. The reverse is also true: if the size of the 
sanction shrinks, it will still have a deterrent effect if the probability of 
imposition ofthe sanction increases (again, with the proviso that the sanction 
exceed the gain from the violation). This relationship is fortunate because 
there becomes reason to believe that as the size of the sanction decreases, it is 
easier to impose the sanction, and the probability that it will be imposed can 
rise. 
It is easier to impose smaller sanctions for two reasons. Courts and other 
actors are probably less reluctant to impose relatively smaller sanctions. In 
addition, we can expect that if the sanction is not very large, the subject of 
the sanction will be less likely to fight against its imposition. On the other 
hand, administrative agencies may be somewhat reluctant to try to impose 
small sanctions if the procedures for doing so are burdensome, because the 
payoff is not perceived as high enough to justify the effort. This suggests that 
general deterrence is best achieved by relatively small sanctions imposed 
through relatively simple procedures. 
Both the size of the sanction as well as the probability of its imposition 
should be considered from the point of view of the potential polluter. Even if 
the sanction is large and there is a high likelihood that it will be imposed, it 
will have no general deterrent effect if the potential polluter is not aware of 
the sanction. In other words, to achieve the effect of general deterrence, 
those who might violate the law must be aware of the size ofthe sanction and 
the likelihood of its imposition. Awareness is probably created where the 
chance of the sanction being imposed is high. Word gets around. On the 
other hand, special publicity, such as through news items, will occur only in 
cases in which the sanction is large enough to attract media attention. 
Turning to the second view of the goals of environmental law, we see that 
to the extent that the aim is to create a proper allocation of resources, 
specific and general deterrence are primary goals of enforcement. An addi-
tional goal is recapture of ill-gotten gains. Recapture is important, in part 
8 Packer, supra note 5, at 43-45. 
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because it contributes to general deterrence. Recapture of ill-gotten gains 
shows potential violators that they will not be better off due to the violation. 
Recapture is even more important for a distinct reason: the need to 
remove the competitive advantage received by the violator. This is essential 
for ensuring that the person who voluntarily complies with the law will not 
be put at a competitive disadvantage as compared to the violator. In part, we 
want to do this in order to deter the potential competitor from also violating 
the law in order to maintain his market po;ition. Put another way, we always 
want to encourage voluntary compliance with the law. Compliance with 
environmental laws is usually costly. Therefore, in order to encourage 
compliance, we must try not to create a situation where the person who 
complies voluntarily is worse off because he bears a cost that his non-
complying competitor avoids. Furthermore, it distorts the market to allow a 
pollution source to keep the savings it has amassed by violating the law. 
Another auxiliary goal under either view of enforcement may be to restore 
the environment to the condition it would ·have been in had the law been 
observed. Whether pollution is the result of immoral behavior or a market 
dislocation, it has adverse effects, and to the extent that its impact persists, it 
should be reversed. This may be done by cleaning up the pollution, restoring 
polluted resources to their unpolluted state, or by providing alternative 
resources to replace the unremediable effects of pollution. 
IV. Enforcement Methods: Description, Evaluation, and Prescription 
This Section describes the various methods employed to enforce Israeli 
and American environmental laws, evaluates each method, and suggests the 
circumstances under which each is appropriate for enforcement. 
1. Major Criminal Sanctions 
a) Description 
Both Israeli and American environmental statutes generally provide crim-
inal sanctions (fines and imprisonment) for violations.' Some Israeli envi-
ronmentallaws specify explicitly that strict liability applies. 10 In these cases, 
9 E.g., Clean Air Act § I 13(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c) (West 1995) (West 1986 & Supp. 
1997); Clean Water Act § 309(c), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d), (e) (West 1995). 
10 E.g., Cleanliness Law 13(1) (as added by Environmental Quality Law (Methods of 
Punishment) (Amendment of Statutes) ch. 2, § 2(6) (1997)) (Isr.). 
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liability is subject to two limitations: (I) only a fine may be imposed unless at 
least negligence is proven, 11 and (2) if the accused can prove that his state of 
mind constituted neither intent, recklessness, nor negligence and that he did 
all that he could to prevent the violation, he is not liable." Other laws have 
no explicit statement as to scienter,l3 and in such cases, it is necessary to 
show at least recklessness. 14 American laws impose criminal liability only for 
knowing, or, occasionally, negligent, violations." The laws of both countries 
impose personal criminal liability on corporate officers, managers, and 
responsible employees for many violations by a business entity." In Israel, 
this personal liability is almost absolute, with very limited defenses available 
to the individual. 17 
II Penal Law § 22(c)(1977)(lsr.). The citation is to section I of amendment 39 to the Penal 
Law (1994 Seier HaHukim [S.H.] 1481), This section adds four new sections to the 
original law; the new sections will be sections 19-22 of the Penal Law. 
12 Penal Law § 22(b). This limitation does not apply in all cases. 
13 E.g., Water Law § 20U (1959), 19931sr. Envt!. Legis. 0-2, 0-12. 
14 Penal Law §§ 19,20. If a law is silent as to the requirement of scienter, but, prior to the 
effective date of the 1994 amendment to the Penal Law, had been interpreted by a court as 
establishing astrict liability offense, then it is a strict liability offense, Penal Law § 22(a). 
15 Clean Air Act § 113(c)(I)-(3), (5); Clean Water Act § 309(c)(2)-(4); Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act § 3008(d), (e), 42 U.S.CA. § 6928(d), (e) (West 1995); all these acts 
specify that the offense must have been done "knowingly," Courts sometimes read 
narrowly the requirement that the violation be knowing. For example, in United States v. 
Hayes Int'I Corp., 786 F.29 1499 (lIth Cir. 1986), the court held that the defendant could 
be held liable for knowingly transporting hazardous waste to a facility lacking a permit. 
The defendant did not have to know that the material shipped was hazardous or that a 
permit was required. It was enough that the defendant knew the identity of the material 
and knew that the facility did not have a permit. The court held that in a heavily·regulated 
industry with significant public health and safety effects, it is reasonable to charge those 
who operate with knowledge ofthe regulatory provisions. Criminal penalties for negligent 
violations are provided in Clean Air Act § II3(c)(4); Clean Water Act § 309(c)(I). The 
Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §407 (West 1986&Supp. 1997), is an exception among United 
States statutes. It sets a criminal penalty for violations without requiring scienter. This 
was held permissible in United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619 (Ist Cir. 1974). 
16 The formulation of who is responsible varies from law to law. In the Israeli laws, compare 
Abatement of Nuisances Law § 14, IS L.S.1. 52, 54 (1960-1961) (liability imposed on a 
person who controlled or supervised a person or place where the violation occurred) with 
Water Law § 20Y (liability imposed on active managers, partners [other than limited 
partners] and officers responsible for the matter). In United States law, compare Clean 
Air Act § 113(c)(6) (responsible corporate officer is liable) and Clean Water Act § 
309(c)(6) (same) with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U,S,C.A. § 6928 
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (parallel section on enforcement with no comparable 
provision). 
17 See, e.g., Water Law § 20Y (to avoid individual responsibility, the person must "prove 
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The severity of the criminal sanction varies considerably between the two 
countries and, to a lesser extent, among various statutes within each country. 
Criminal fines are much higher in the United States. The Israeli Water Law, 
for example, provides criminal fines ofNIS 268,000 (currently about $77,000) 
or a year's imprisonment for each violation." The structure of the law 
suggests that this amount probably is not to be imposed for each day that the 
violation continues, at least where the violating activity is ongoing. 19 The law 
also imposes a fine of NIS 17,800 (about $5,100) or imprisonment for seven 
days per day for an offense that continues after an official warning.20 In 
comparison, the American Clean Water Act provides criminalfines of up to 
$25,000 per day of violation and imprisonment for a year for negligent 
violations and fines of $50,000 per day and three years for knowing viola-
tions. 2l Whether or not a warning has been given is irrelevant. Fines well in 
excess of $1 million have been imposed.22 Furthermore, the fines under the 
Israeli Water Law are among the highest provided in all of Israeli environ-
mental law. While the fines for violating several other laws were recently 
brought into line with those imposed by the Water Law," other laws still set 
lower penalty amounts. For example, the fines in the Prevention of Pollution 
of the Sea from Land-Based Sources Law are NIS 50,000 ($14,000) or one 
that the offense was committed without his knowledge and that he took all reasonable 
measure to prevent or stop the offense"). A recent amendment to the Penal Law may 
ameliorate the apparent severity of such provisions. Penal Law §§ 18, 19. 
18 Water Law § 20U. 
19 The Law expressly sets a fine per day for violations that continue after a warning, but 
only sets one fine for a violation up to the time of warning; Water Law § 20U. This 
probably should be read to set a fine for the violation as a whole prior to the time of 
warning. 
20 Water Law § 20U. 
21 Clean Water Act § 309(c)(I) (addressing negligent violations); § 309(c)(2) (addressing 
knowing violations). Under both subsections, the maximum punishment is doubled for 
violations after the first conviction. In addition, a special provision on crimes inVOlving 
"knowing endangerment" (knowingly placing a person "in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily injury") provides a penalty of up to $250,000 and fiftee,n years imprison-
ment for an individual and of up to $1 million for an organization. Again, penalties are 
double for violations after a conviction. 
22 See Environmental Crimes & Enforcement Committee, 1996 Ann. Rep., 1996 Nat. 
Resources, Energy, & Envt!. L., The Year in Review 152, 155-56 (describing cases 
imposing criminal fines of $1 million, $3 million, $22 million, and $75 million under 
various environmental statutes). 
23 Environmental Quality Law (Methods of Punishment) (Amendments to Statutes). 
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year's imprisonment per violation, with an additional NIS 1,000 ($300) per 
day imposed for an offense that continues after conviction." 
In practice, Israeli courts that impose criminal fines tend to impose a fine 
that is lower than the maximum allowed by law, adding a higher fine that is 
to be paid only if the violator does not meet conditions specified in the court 
order, such as a requirement to desist further pollution." 
Israeli law has several features that are not found in its American counter-
part. Many Israeli environmental laws provide that criminal penalties be 
paid into a special fund, rather than into the State treasury." Such a 
provision does not exist in American law. In Israel, but not in the United 
States, private persons may initiate actions for criminal sanctions under 
most environmentallaws.27 Israeli criminal law includes a general provision 
that allows a court in a criminal proceeding to issue an order 'requiring a 
person convicted of a crime to pay damages for injury or suffering." The 
effectiveness of this provision is limited because the maximum amount of the 
payment is NIS 84,400 ($24,000), which is not likely to be full compensation 
in many environmental cases. In addition, several environmental statutes 
provide that the court order in a criminal proceeding may include an order 
that the guilty party repay costs of correcting the environmental damage 
caused by the violation to whomever took corrective action and then sought 
repayment as part of the proceeding." One statute allows the court to cancel 
a license issued under the law that the defendant was guilty of violating. 3D 
24 Prevention ofPoJlution from Land-Based Sources Law § 6(a) (1988), 1993 Isr. BuvtL 
Legis. E·20, E·22. 
25 See Ministry of the Environment, Legal Bureau, Court Decisions 1994-1997 (Feb. 24, 
1997) (Hebrew). 
26 E.g., Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 32 (1980), 
1993 lsI'. Envtl. Legis. B-2, B-8; Maintenance of Cleanliness Law §§ 10, 13(b), 38 L.S.L 
190, 192, 194 (1983-1984) (except that fines assessed by special local courts are paid into 
the treasury of the local authority, such as the municipality). 
27 E.g., Water Law § 20Y; Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version) § 68, app. 2, 36 
L.S.I. 35,49,79 (1981-1982), amended by Prevention of Sea Pollution from Land~Based 
Sources Law § 15 (1988), 1993 ISL EnvtL Legis. E~20, E-24. 
28 Penal Law § 77(a). 
29 E.g., Cleanliness Law § toe (as added by Environmental Quality Law [Methods of 
Punishment] [Amendments to Statutes] § 3[8]); Water Law § 20 (24)(1). 
30 Dangerous Substances Law § 15a(5) (as added by Environmental Quality Law [Methods 
of Punishment] [Amendments to Statutes] § 5[5]). 
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b) Evaluation - Efficacy 
Criminal sanctions inflict retribution only if the sanctions are actually 
imposed. This requires that the relevant actors in various parts of the 
criminaljustice system agree that retribution for violation of environmental 
laws is appropriate. If there is no such consensus, the complex machinery 
needed to impose a criminal sanction will not operate. Prosecutors will not 
prosecute and judges will not convict. 
Nonetheless, the criminal sanction is perhaps the main enforcement 
mechanism used in Israel. 
In the United States, by contrast, despite the fact that almost all laws 
provide criminal sanctions, such sanctions are imposed primarily for viola-
tions of rules for handling wastes" or for very serious violations of other 
laws. 3' In these cases, retribution is probably seen as a particularly fitting 
goal. Wastes denominated as "hazardous" are generally seen as especially 
dangerous to public health, so their mishandling is much like traditional 
criminal activity that endangers persons. Overall, criminal sanctions are not 
used frequently in the United States, although its use is on the rise.3) 
It is not clear how well criminal fines work as a general deterrent. The 
usual objection to imposing any monetary fine, penalty, or other assessment 
for violation of an environmental law is that the violator can simply consider 
the assessment as one of the costs of doing business and pass the cost through 
to the consumer .34 If the fines are high enough to make it difficult to pass 
them through and are imposed frequently enough, they will have a general 
deterrent effect. Their efficacy in this way does not depend, however, on 
their criminal nature. The fact that criminal sanctions are procedurally 
31 Compare 1 W. Rodgers, Environmental Law § 3.38 (1986) (reporting little criminal 
enforcement of the Clean Air Act) and 2 W. Rodgers, Environmental Law § 4.40 (1986) 
(reporting little criminal enforcement of the Clean Water Act) with 4 W. Rodgers, 
Environmental Law § 7.23 (1992) (reporting more common criminal enforcement of the 
provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act which regulate hazardous 
waste). There has been serious consideration of broader use of criminal sanctions in the 
U.S., although some question the efficacy of such sanctions. See Decriminalization, 
supra note 2, at 379~84. 
32 See cases cited in Environmental Crimes & Enforcement Committee, supra note 22, at 
155-56. 
33 See Environmental Crimes & Enforcement Committee, supra note 22, at 155~56; S. 
Bellew & D. Surtz, Comment, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: A 
Corporate Guide fO Avoiding Liability, 8 ViiI. Envtl. LJ. 205,235 n. 172 (1997). 
34 For regulated industries, this requires that the violator include the assessment as part of 
the rate base. 
ENFORCEMENT GOALS & METHODS 145 
difficult to impose almost certainly impacts the frequency of imposition and 
decreases their efficacy for general deterrence. 
In theory, incarceration should be a strong general deterrent to violating 
environmental statutes. Incarceration is one sanction that can not be passed 
through to the consumer. Yet criminal incarceration will serve as a general 
deterrent only if it is imposed with high enough frequency to convince 
potential violators not to take the risk. Because incarceration appears as a 
very harsh sanction for environmental violations, it may be difficult to have 
it imposed with sufficient frequency. 
In the United States, over the course ofthe five years dating from 1991 to 
1995, between twenty-two and sixty-nine years of incarceration were imposed 
each year in all the criminal actions for environmental violations brought in 
the country." This was enough to warrant a great deal of attention in the 
literature," but it is not clear what the rate of incarceration was (what 
percentage of violators spent time in prison) or whether this represents 
enough of a threat to change substantially the behavior of those corporate 
officials who would not otherwise follow the law. In Israel, which has a low 
record of criminal incarceration for violation of the environmentallaws,37 
the threat of such incarceration may have some effect, but it is hard to 
measure. 
The same questions arise regarding the efficacy of the criminal sanction 
for specific deterrence. 
Criminal fines that are suspended on the condition that the violator meet 
specific requirements set out in a court order or not repeat the violation, can 
work well for promoting the goal of specific deterrence. Nonetheless, they 
cut against general deterrence. If most of the fine is suspended, much of the 
general deterrent effect is lost. A source can then violate, wait to be caught, 
pay a small fine, and thereby avoid the larger fine by belatedly coming into 
compliance. 
Criminal sanctions are not well-suited to recovering the savings of non-
compliance, since that savings is not necessarily taken into account in fixing 
. the penalty amount. 
Israeli criminal orders require clean-up help to restore the damaged 
35 Bellew & Surtz, supra note 33. This figure excludes suspended portions of prison 
sentences. 
36 E.g., M. Herz, Structures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 7 Fordham Envtl. 
L.J. 679 (1996). 
37 See Ministry of the Environment, supra note 25. 
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environment, although this is a problematic method for obtaining the civil 
remedy of restoration. Because the orders are issued only against those 
convicted for environmental crimes, increased standards of proof and other 
complications of criminal proceedings apply. Such remedies should not be 
seen as an effective way of obtaining environmental clean-up. Rather, they 
serve as a nice addendum to the criminal sanction when it is otherwise 
imposed. 
Criminal sanctions may help to restore the damaged environment in a 
different way under those Israeli statutes that provide for the payment of 
criminal fines into a special fund. This fund can be used for environmental 
restoration.38 The use of special funds for criminal fines may be criticized as 
encouraging "overzealous" enforcement. The argument is that if administra-
tive authorities believe that their own programs will benefit from increased 
funding from the collection of criminal fines, they will be excessively eager to 
identify violations and to bring criminal enforcement actions. This argument 
is not convincing. First, it would apply only for substantial violations where 
the size of the probable fine makes the enforcement action worthwhile. In 
regard to such violations, vigorous enforcement is appropriate and not 
"overzealous." Second, the argument about enforcement incentives works 
both ways. The fact that in the absence of special funds, the agencies 
responsible for enforcing the laws must spend time and money to do so, 
without seeing any programmatic benefit, may be a disincentive to reason-
ably aggressive enforcement. Therefore, the special fund only removes the 
disincentive. It does not "overcorrect," because it still does not give agency 
personnel anything except indirect rewards (recognition, increased budgets) 
for enforcement. 
c) Workability 
Criminal sanctions have a low degree of workability for a number of 
reasons. The costs to the enforcing agency of imposing such sanctions are 
high. The need to involve authorities not well-versed in environmental law 
and more accustomed to pursuing more traditional criminals or else with 
38 See, e.g., Prevention of Sea~Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 14 
(1980), 1993 Isr. Envtl. Legis. E-2, E-3; Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § to. The 
number of statutes under which criminal penalties are paid into special environmental 
funds was recently expanded. Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] 
[Amendments to Statutes). 
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differing political agendas can pose a real barrier to criminal enforcement." 
Similarly, it is difficult to get a court to impose a criminal sanction, due to 
both heightened requirements of proof as well as to the view of some judges 
that a criminal penalty is not appropriate for a "mere" environmental 
violation. This latter problem is certainly more pronounced in Israel, where 
awareness of environmental matters is still in its embryonic stage in compar-
ison to the United States. 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
It may be claimed that criminal sanctions generally are substantively fair, 
if only because both the protections for defendants in the criminal justice 
system as well as the hesitancy to recognize environmental violations as 
crimes prevent imposition of such sanctions for any except the most egregious 
of environmental offenses. Still, as with other administrative offenses, the 
question may be raised as to whether it is fundamentally fair to label the 
violator a criminal. The answer depends in part on how the objective of 
environmental law is defined. If environmental law is seen as proscribing 
immoral behavior, then the label is deserved; but as discussed above, not 
everyone agrees with this rationale for environmental laws. Furthermore, in 
many cases it is difficult to prove a connection between the outlawed activity 
and any real harm to the health or other interests of the community. 
Therefore, the deservedness ofthe criminal label is questionable, particularly 
for minor violations of technical requirements.40 
Strong procedural protections are provided to an alleged violator before 
imposition of major criminal sanctions. 
39 See Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 429-30 (describing friction between the U,S. 
Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Justice in criminal 
prosecutions of violators of environmental laws); I. Zamir, The Administrative Offences 
Law: An Introductory Note, 21 lsr. L. Rev. 201, 202-03 (1986). 
40 See Zamir, supra note 39. Zamir questions whether this Jack of a clear relationship 
between violation and sanction will generate disrespect for the law. Professor Kenneth 
Mann raises another concern; he says that in cases where only the criminal sanction is 
available, concerns that the criminal sanction is too harsh will lead authorities to hesitate 
to impose any sanction at all on violators deserving of some sanction. Furthermore, if the 
criminal sanction is employed, its use will be unfair, since it will be imposed only on a 
small number of violators, while other violators will escape any sanction. Mann, supra 
note I, at 243-44. 
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e) Summary 
While major criminal sanctions may serve several enforcement goals, 
many of these goals are better served by other types of sanctions, to be 
discussed below. Moreover, there are significant drawbacks to the criminal 
sanction. Therefore, major criminal sanctions should be reserved for those 
cases where these drawbacks are minimized, that is, for violations that are 
regarded as sufficiently "bad" for prosecutors to prosecute, for judges to 
impose criminal sanctions, and for the community to see imposition of the 
sanction as fair. This will also solve some of the workability problems 
insofar as it will free the mechanism of the criminal process from dealing 
with all but the most egregious of violations. 
2. Minor Criminal Fines 
a) Description 
Several Israeli laws set up a special mechanism for imposing small criminal 
fines. For example, the law on marine pollution by oil provides that when a 
summons for a criminal proceeding is issued, the authority issuing the 
summons may offer the recipient of the summons the option of paying a 
stated fine instead of being subject to a criminal trial. 41 Under this statute, 
the amount of the fine is set by regulations.42 If a person pays the fine, it is to 
be considered a determination of guilt in a criminal proceeding.43 The 
amounts of the fine are smaller than the amounts a court could impose in a 
criminal proceeding, with the maximum fine for a first offense set at NIS 
6,250 (about $1 ,800), as compared with the NIS 37,500 ($10,800) maximum 
for court-imposed fines." 
A general law on criminal procedure sets up a similar system for imposing 
minor fines for violations of the laws on air pollution and on maintenance of 
cleanliness.45 While the small criminal fines used to be quite low, recent 
amendments provide for fines in an amount of up to ten percent of the fines 
41 Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 24 (1980),1993 Isr. 
Envtl. Legis. E-2, E-6. 
42 Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 25(a), 
43 Prevention of Sea-Water Pollut:o.n by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 26. 
44 Compare Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 25(b) 
(on fines by summons) with § 18(a) (on court-imposed fines). The maximum fine by 
summons for a repeat offense is NIS 12,500 ($3,700). 
45 Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version); Order On Finable Offenses (Air Pollu-
tion), 3659 Kovetz Takanot [K.T.] 837 (1977); Order on Finable Offenses (Maintenance 
of Cleanliness), 4751 K. T. 546 (1985). 
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that a court could impose. For example, the maximum fine by summons 
under the Maintenance of Cleanliness Law used to be NIS 490 ($140), but it 
is now either NIS 4,980 ($1,400) or NIS 15,000 ($4,300), depending on the 
violation.46 Similar fines are provided under the laws on air pollution and 
public health (which covers a variety of environmental nuisances), and 
higher fines can be imposed under the law on dangerous substances.47 
Furthermore, higher fines are provided for violations by organizations, for 
continuing violations, and for repeated violations.48 
As described above, some Israeli statutes establish special funds that can 
be used for cleaning up pollution caused in violation of these statutes and for 
other uses related to the statutory purpose. Minor criminal fines assessed 
under these statutes are also paid into the special funds and not into the 
national treasury.49 
b) Evaluation - Efficacy 
It is questionable whether small criminal fines, as they have been employed 
in Israel, are an effective general deterrent. In the past, these fines were quite 
low, and it is not clear whether they were sufficient to affect behavior. On the 
other hand, the ease with which such fines can be imposed suggests that they 
could be used with sufficient frequency to have some general deterrent effect. 
As the amount of the fines grows, the deterrent effect may become stronger. 
However, if the amount seems too large, the alleged violator will have an 
incentive to fight its imposition, which will prevent the frequent application 
necessary for achieving general deterrence. If the amount is small, the fines 
can be easily imposed, but they do not deter violations that save significant 
sums of money for the violating source. 
It is in their capacity as special deterrents that small criminal fines are 
most important. In this regard, they are probably highly effective with 
respect to minor violations, since they play an important educational role. 
46 Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § 13(a) (as added by Environmental Quality Law 
[Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] § 2[7]); Abatement of Nuisances 
Law § lied) (as added by Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [A~ 
mendment of Statutes] § 3[10]). 
47 Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] chs. 3, 
5,6 (air pollution, dangerous substances, and public health, respectively). 
48 Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] chs. 2, 
3,5,6. 
49 E.g., Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 32. 
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An individual who is subjected to a fine for a violation such as littering is 
probably less likely to repeat the violation. 
If the small fines are paid into a special fund, they may be used to clean up 
pollution and restore polluted areas. 
c) Workability 
The greatest advantage of small criminal penalties is related to their 
meausre of workability: as long as the violator does not request a full court 
hearing, the fines are easily imposed. This advantage may decrease as the 
amounts of the fines sought increase. 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
In at least some cases, small criminal fines may seem to present a problem 
with regard to substantive fairness. Since the amounts of the fines, even after 
the recent increases, are relatively small, they are most likely designed to be 
used in cases of minor infractions. Yet it is'exactly for such minor offenses 
that it seems inappropriate to attach a criminal stigma. On the other hand, it 
may be cljlimed that environmental violations, even minor ones, harm the 
entire community and warrant the criminal sanction. Furthermore, when 
the fines are imposed for actions such as polluting the ocean with oil from 
ships, the argument against the fairness of a criminal sanction is less 
persuasive. 
Since the issue of substantive fairness is not clear-cut, it seems logical to 
ask whether there is a genuine need to attach the criminal label to such fines. 
!fthe purpose of the sanction is to deter violations by making them costly, it 
seems that this end would be served just as well if the fines were civil in 
nature. This also would be true if the purpose were educational. 
Small criminal fines present no procedural fairness problem. An alleged 
violator can choose to stand trial in a full criminal proceeding. 50 In the trial, 
he will receive all the protections granted in criminal proceedings. 
3. Civil Compliance Orders 
a) Description 
Israeli environmental law differs mostly from the American law in the 
scope of the authority that is granted to the courts to impose civil remedies. 
American statutes provide courts with extensive authority to impose civil 
50 E.g., Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) §§ 24, 27. 
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remedies on those who violate environmental laws. These remedies are 
imposed in civil proceedings, at the behest of the government. These civil 
proceedings are not public nuisance actions, but special statutory proceedings 
designed to enforce the environmental laws with special statutorily provided 
remedies. 
For example, under both the Clean Air ActSl and the Clean Water Act," 
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter 
"EPA") may bring an action for injunctive relief against alleged violators. 
Injunctive relief may include orders to cease violations or orders to take 
specific steps to cease the violation. 
American courts, at times, have used their civil remedy authority to 
fashion rather creative remedies. Courts have imposed receiverships on 
pu blic facilities not complying with environmental laws, directing the receiver 
to bring the facility into compliance. 53 Other courts have appointed adminis-
trators with a different set of formal powers, but essentially with the same 
obligation to ensure that the facility complies with the law. 54 They have also 
imposed sewer moratoria. 55 These are orders prohibiting the hook-up of new 
sewerage connections to sewage treatment plants that violate water pollution 
control laws. Such orders have a nice rationality: if a plant cannot adequately 
treat the sewage it is receiving, it should not be allowed to receive additional 
sewage. The orders also have an important political dimension in that they 
mobilize building contractors to pressure the plant to comply with the law. 
Courts have also ordered companies that violated reporting requirements 
under environmental laws to conduct audits at their facilities. 56 Given an 
appropriate request from the enforcing agency and a flexible judge, the 
possibilities are virtually unlimited. 57 
51 Clean Air Act 113(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(b) (West 1995). 
52 Clean Water Act §§ 309(b), (d), (0, 402(h), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1319(b), (d), (I), 1342(h)(West 
1986 & Supp. 1997). 
53 E.g., United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (B.D. Mich. 1979) (appointing 
mayor of city as "administrator," but specifically granting him the powers of a receiver). 
54 E.g., People v. SanitaryDist. of Decatur, No. 82w3375 (C.D.1I1. Dec. 29, 1982); described 
in M. Gelpe, Pollution Control /.AJws Against Public Facilities, I3 Harv. Envt!. L. Rev. 
69, 127 (1989). 
55 E.g., United States v. Douglas County,S Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1577 (D. Nev. May 16, 
1973). See generally Gelpe, supra note 54, at 119-20, 
56 The cases, which arose under the Toxic Substances Control Act, are discussed in 3 
Rodgers, supra note 31, § 6.lO (1988), This could lead to detection and remediation or 
prosecution of additional violations, 
57 See the cases under the Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, which are discussed in 
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In some cases, the authority of American courts to issue such creative 
types of orders derives from general statutory authorization. For example, 
the Clean Water Act explicitly authorizes courts to provide "appropriate 
relief. "58 But such explicit authorization may not be necessary; even without 
it, federal courts have considerable discretion in shaping injunctive 
remedies. 59 
Israeli laws do not explicitly provide comparable authority. The closest 
thing is the authority courts have under a few laws to issue orders to violators 
to comply with the requirements of the laws, to prevent future violations, or 
to clean up pollution caused by a violation and to restore the area to its 
pre-violation condition.60 Such powers differ from the broad authority 
found in American law in many important respects. To begin with, not all 
Israeli laws provide such authority. Those that do generally authorize issu-
ance of only a limited range of types of orders, and sometimes the orders 
have only a very limited duration. Most importantly, Israeli courts are 
authorized to provide such relief only against a person who has been 
convicted of a criminal violation and only in the context of criminal proceed-
ings. In some cases, the courts have authority to issue such a "civil" type of 
order only for the period between indictment for acrime and decision on the 
criminal charge.6 ! 
4 Rodgers, supra note 31. Stipulated penalties are another type of special feature that 
may be included in COUft orders. Discussion of such penalties, which are similar to 
liquidated damages in contracts, is beyond the scope ofthis paper. See Gelpe, supra note 
54, at 108-15. 
58 Clean Water Act § 309(b). 
59 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). Congress could, alieast to 
some extent, explicitly limit that authority. 
60 E.g., Water Law § 20X (1959), I993Isr. Envt!. Legis. D-2, D-13 (order to pay clean-up 
costs incurred by any person, to do what is needed to stop the pollution, to clean up the 
water, and to restore the condition that existed before the violation). The statute that 
applies to air, odor, and noise pollution used to provide the authority for courts to issue 
orders "to refrain from any act which caused the offence of which [the person] has been 
convicted." Abatement of Nuisances Law § 11(b). This statute was recently amended, 
and such authority was deleted; Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] 
[Amendment of Statutes] § 3(9). 
61 E.g., Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § 14a. This provision was added by a recent 
amendment (Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of 
Statutes] § 2[8]). The Water Law has an unusual provision authorizing the court to issue 
an order to prevent, cease, or reduce pollution to someone who is merely suspected or 
accused of committing an offense under the law; Water Law § 20W(a). Such orders could 
be a potent tool, but they are severely limited in duration. In the case of someone who has 
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Several of the Israeli statutes provide for a different type of judicial relief. 
Courts may order a person convicted of violating an environmental law to 
compensate anyone who cleaned up the pollution for the costs he incurred.62 
b) Evaluation - Efficacy 
Civil orders are designed mainly as specific deterrents; that is, they are 
aimed at bringing a violating facility into compliance. Even as such, there is a 
question as to whether they actually accomplish this goal. What good does it 
do to have a court order a facility to do what the law already requires the 
facility to do? If a facility has already shown that it will violate the law, what 
is there to suggest that it will now obey a court order? 
OQ.e answer is that an order by a court carries extra weight, because the 
honor of the court and the remedy of contempt stand behind the order. A 
second answer is that facilities pay more attention to court orders because 
they are specific rather than general. The order of a court is directed at a 
specific party, whereas the requirements of the law are directed at all sources. 
Yet another answer proposes that civil orders work mainly in cases where 
some special remedy is ordered, such as a receivership or a sewer moratorium. 
These are remedies that go beyond the prima facie requirements of the law. 
Civil orders should not be expected to have much value in general deter-
rence. After all, they basically require the violator to do what was required of 
him to begin with. If not accompanied by some extra "pain," they provide no 
motivation for sources not to ignore the requirements ofthe law and to wait 
until they are caught. "Pain" can be inflicted by publicity, but whether this is 
effective depends on the attitude of the particular society toward environ-
mental violations. At present, American polluters are probably more sensi-
tive to adverse publicity regarding environmental problems than their Israeli 
counterparts. 
Only in their more creative form are civil orders weJl-suited for purposes 
other than specific deterrence. For example, a civil order to publicize viola-
not been formally indicted for an offense, the maximum duration of the order is only 
seven days; thus, this is not a useful tool for stemming pollution over the course of the 
type of lengthy investigation that may be required. Water Law § 20W(c). Not all laws 
grantsuch authority to issue civil-type orders. For anexample of a law that does provide 
such authority, see Prevention of Sea Pollution from Land~Based Sources Law. 
62 E.g., Abatement of Nuisances Law § lOa(c) (as added by Environmental Quality Law 
[Methods of Punishment] [Amendment of Statutes] § 3[8]); Dangerous Substances Law 
§ 15a(c). 
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tions may work as a general deterrent. Orders may also require clean-up and 
restoration of polluted areas. 
c) Workability 
It is easier for an American administrative authority to get a civil order 
than it is for an Israeli authority to obtain a civil-type remedy, since the 
Israeli authority must bring a criminal, rather than civil, proceeding. The 
costs of civil litigation still present a significant barrier, of course, but it is not 
as high a barrier as is posed by the special procedural and other requirements 
of criminal proceedings. 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
Civil court orders raise no fairness problems for defendants against whom 
the law is being enforced. With regard to substantive fairness, a defendant 
can raise no reasonable objection that the remedy is disproportionately 
harsh, even in the context of the creative remedies ordered by American 
courts, as long as the requirements in the court order are closely connected to 
those imposed in the underlying laws. As for procedural fairness, since the 
remedy is civil, the protections offered by the civil proceeding in court are 
sufficient. 
There is, however, some cause for concern regarding substantive and 
procedural fairness to third parties connected to some of the creative remedies 
ordered by American courts. In cases such as sewer moratoria, the court 
order may affect such third parties as building contractors and property 
buyers who are not represented in the litigation between the government and 
the violating facility. Courts should allow representatives of affected third 
parties to participate in the formulation of the remedy in order to protect 
their legitimate interests. It should be recalled, however, that insofar as what 
such third parties want (such as unrestricted development) will cause viola-
tions of pollution control laws, their interests do not warrant strong legal 
protection. 
4. Civil Penalties 
a) Description 
Many American statutes provide for enforcement through court-imposed 
civil penalties. 63 These penalties are imposed by courts at the request of the 
63 E.g., Clean Air Act § I 13(b); Clean Water Act § 309(d); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(a), (g) (West 1995). 
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government, are paid into the treasury, and are denominated by the statutes 
as civil rather than criminal in nature. The amounts of the penalties may be 
substantial - up to $25,000 per day per violation." Courts have imposed 
total civil penalties in the millions of dollars," although smaller assessments 
are typical and substantial portions of the large penalty assessments are 
sometimes later forgiven. 66 
The fact that these penalties are denominated as "civil" suggests that they 
are not designed to be punitive. Yet some facets of the authorizing statutes 
and of the case law suggest otherwise. The Clean Water Act provides that in 
"determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the 
seriousness ofthe violation ... , any history of such violations, any good-faith 
efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, ... and such other 
matters as justice may require. "6' These factors resemble those that are 
typically considered when determining whether a defendant is deserving of 
punishment through a criminal sanction. In addition, the case law indicates 
that for some purposes, the civil penalties are to be considered pena1.68 No 
doubt, at least when the penalties are large, they do have a retributive 
character. 
Other features of the penalties are clearly civil in nature. For example, the 
economic benefit secured by the violator is relevant in fixing the penalty 
amount, which should work to recapture that benefit." Moreover, labels do 
matter." The stigma attached to criminal convictions probably does not 
attach to these civil assessments.'! 
No comparable enforcement method is found in the Israeli laws. 
64 E.g., Clean Air Act § 113(b); Clean Water Act § 309(d). Some penalties under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are limited to $25,000 per violation. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6928(g) (West 1995). 
65 E.g., United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 770 (W.O. Tex. 1985) ($4.5 
million). 
66 Gelpe, supra note 54, at 89-92. 
67 Clean Water Act § 309(d). 
68 E.g., United States v. Edwards, 667 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (holding that civil 
penalties are punitive for purposes of determining whether they survive the death of the 
violator). 
69 Clean Water Act § 309(d). 
70 See M. eheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal LAw 
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal Civil Law Distinction, 42 
Hastings L..!. 1325 (1991). 
71 In fact, it has been suggested that one of the main advantages of such penalties is that they 
preserve the special quality of criminal sanction for serious transgressions involving 
culpable conduct. [d., at 1346. 
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b) Evaluation - Efficacy 
While these penalties may have some retributive effect, their principal 
value is in their role as general deterrents. 72 Large penalties create headlines, 
which can be assumed to have a deterrent effect. Even small penalties, if 
applied to a great many sources, send a clear message that the law must be 
obeyed." 
Civil penalties are also effective for achieving the economic goal of en-
forcement: recapturing savings from non-compliance. For example, the 
Clean Water Act provides explicitly that a court should consider "the 
economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation" in setting the penalty.74 
The purpose of this provision - to prevent violators from obtaining an 
economic advantage over their competitors75 - can be attained if penalties 
are imposed on a consistent basis. 
Other factors considered in determining penalty amounts under American 
law include the ability of the violator to pay and the seriousness of the 
violation.'6 The relevance of such factors may be fairly debated. It has been 
argued that both fairness and effective deterrence require consideration of 
ability to pay.77 On the other hand, if the main element of the penalty is 
recapture of savings, ability to pay should be irrelevant. Compliance would 
have required the expenditures in the first place, regardless of ability to pay. 
Therefore, ability to pay should be considered only in determining how 
much higher than the economic savings should the penalty be set, and in 
setting a payment schedule. For sources in strong economic condition, the 
ability-to-pay factor requires setting the penalty high in order for it to be an 
effective specific and general deterrent. For sources with more limited 
means, the ability-to-pay factor may mean adding a smaller extra amount 
beyond the economic savings or providing for payment over a longer period. 
For such sources, deterrence will work without a large penalty amount. 
The relevance of the seriousness of the violation in setting penalty amounts 
is also questionable. If this is a surrogate for determining the degree of 
72 Cj. Cheh, supra note 70, at 1347-48 (the civil remedy of forfeiture encourages those 
dealing with transgressors to monitor their behavior to avoid impacts of the forfeitures). 
73 On the findings as to consistent use"of small civil penalties in the state of Wisconsin, see 
Gelpe, supra note 54, at 88-90. 
74 Clean Water Act § 309(d). See alsa Clean Air Act § II3(e). 
75 See 2 Rodgers, supra note 31, § 4.2A (Supp. 1992). 
76 See Clean Air Act § 113(e). 
77 Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 388, 
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environmental harm, it is an acceptable consideration. It is also acceptable 
as a consideration in determining whether the cost to the government of an 
enforcement action is justified at all. But if seriousness is used to measure 
deservedness of punishment, it is of questionable relevance in a civil proceed-
ing. It is preferable to keep the civil nature of the penalty clear by basing the 
penalty amounts on savings recapture plus an additional sum sufficient to 
deter. 
Because civil penalties are paid into the general treasury, they are not 
useful for clean-up and restoration of areas affected by pollution. Still, the 
mere existence of civil penalties in fact often leads to clean-up and restoration 
activities. Suits for civil penalties tend to be settled between the parties," 
because under American law, liability is clear and the penalty amounts are 
high. It is not unusual to find, as part of a settlement, an agreement by the 
alleged violator to fund clean-up and restoration work. Although this prac-
tice has stirred some debate," it has been recognized in the Clean Air Act. 
Since 1990, this Act has authorized courts to order that up to $100,000 of an 
assessed civil penalty be used for clean-up, restoration, or other "beneficial 
mitigation projects" that serve the purposes of the Act and "enhance the 
public health or the environment. ''80 This authorization is limited, however, 
to enforcement actions brought by citizens and does not extend to enforce-
ment actions brought by government authorities. 
As in the context of criminal fines, courts must be careful with allowing 
forgiveness of civil penalties for sources that later come into compliance with 
the law. Forgiveness can provide a good motivation for a source to comply, 
but sources are supposed to comply with the law without this added motiva-
tion. If a penalty is completely or almost completely forgiven, all value for 
general deterrence is lost. Violators must always be required to pay the full 
economic savings from their earlier non-compliance. The mere fact that they 
came into compliance late will almost always entail a savings in that the 
source had use of the funds not expended on timely compliance. In addition, 
there must always be some penalty for violation in order to give an economic 
advantage to those sources that have complied voluntarily. 
78 1 Rodgers, supra note 31, at 539. 
79 See M. Gelpe & 1.L. Barnes, Penalties in Settlements of Citizen Suit Enforcement 
Actions Under the Clean Water Act, 16 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1025 (1990). 
80 Clean Air Act § 304(g)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(g)(2) (West 1995). 
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c) Workability 
It is easier for enforcing agencies to obtain civil penalties than criminal 
penalties, for the same reason that it is easier to obtain civil enforcement 
orders. The criminal law system can be avoided. 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
The main difficulties with civil penalties arise in this area. Since the 
penalties are imposed in civil proceedings, there is a question as to whether 
the procedures used are sufficient to guarantee a fair proportionality between 
the penalty and the violation and as to whether further procedural protec-
tions are due the alleged violator by virtue of the quasi-punitive nature of the 
penaltiesY 
To the extent that the penalties are based on recovering economic gain, 
they are civil in nature and require no further procedures than those usually 
available in a civil trial. More troublesome is the issue of procedural fairness 
in relation to the punitive aspect of the penalties. American courts have 
largely overlooked this issue in the environmental context, finding that a 
penalty denominated by the legislature as civil is indeed civil and no criminal 
procedural rights attach. s, Some dissenting voices have been heard in the 
case law and, to an even greater extent, it the literature. The literature 
generally addresses broader issues of civil-type remedies under many different 
types of statutes and suggests that some of these remedies are sufficiently 
punitive in nature to require that at least some of the procedural guarantees 
of criminal proceedings be provided. B3 
Some commentators suggest jettisoning the distinction between civil and 
criminal proceedings as determinative of the procedures due a defendant 
and finding an intermediate ground for the types of special enforcement 
actions found in modern regulatory statutes.84 Specifically, it has been 
suggested that in the United States, the necessary procedural guarantees 
could be decided on a case-by-case basis, using the procedural due process 
81 See Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 370-74; Mann, supra note 1, at 260-61. 
82 E.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.s.. 412 (1987), For a discussion of eases not limited to 
the environmental area, see Mann, supra note I, at 254-55. 
83 See Mann, supra note I, at 254-55; Decriminalization, supra note 2, at 397 -419. In the 
United States, even if the penalties are considered to be civil in nature, procedural issues 
arise regarding the right to trial by jury. These were settled in Tull. 481 U.S. at 412. 
84 See Mann, supra note 1. 
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test set out by the Supreme Court." The problem with this proposal is that it 
requires case-by-case determination of rights due a defendant. Until the 
case law decides enough cases under enough statutes, the uncertainty will be 
high, as will the cost of litigating to settle that uncertainty. 
Israeli law already provides a perhaps more viable, alternative solution to 
this problem. As under the laws for small criminal penalties, the defendant 
could be offered the option of a criminal adjudication. An agency could file a 
civil complaint against an alleged violator, asking for court-imposed civil 
penalties in a stated amount. The defendant would then have the option of 
requesting a criminal proceeding in which he would be subject to any 
criminal penalty provided by law and also to the opprobrium that a possible 
criminal conviction would carry. 
5. Administrative Compliance Orders 
a) Description 
Under most environmental statutes in both Israel and the United States, 
the administrative agency charged with implementing the statute may order 
a violating facility to comply with the requirements of the law. 86 Under some 
statutes, the agency is granted general authority to issue an order." Other 
statutes delineate more specifically the types of requirements that may be 
imposed in an order." Usually the agency is given a free hand in issuing such 
orders; a few statutes impose specific procedural requirements, although 
even these tend to be minimal. 89 
Administrative orders differ from civil compliance orders issued by courts 
in that the former do not carry the weight of a judicial determination. This 
may affect the willingness of a violator to comply with the order. Under 
American law, while a civil court order may be enforced by relatively 
85 This suggestion is advanced by Cheh, supra note 70, at 1394, The Supreme Court case 
that Cheh refers to is Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
86 Examples from Israeli law include Abatement of Nuisances Law § 8(a), 15 L.S.I. 52, 53 
(1960-1961); Water Law § 20G. 20H (1959),1993 Isf. Envt!. Legis. D-2, D-8, D-9. These 
orders may be called "orders," "instructions," or "notices." The term used is of no legal 
importance. In American law, examples are found in the Clean Air Act § 113(a)(I), 
(3)(B); and the Clean Water Act § 309(a)(3). 
87 E,g., Abatement of Nuisances Law § 8; Clean Air Act § 113(a)(I). 
88 E.g., Water Law § 20H. 
89 The Clean Air Act requires that the person to whom certain orders are issued have "an 
opportunity to confer with the Administrator concerning the alleged violation." § 
113(a)(4). 
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abbreviated contempt proceedings, an administrative order may be enforced 
only by a full civil or criminal proceeding.9o Still, a court proceeding for 
enforcing an administrative order may be abbreviated if the court gives great 
deference to the administrative determination in formulating the order. 
b) Evaluation - Efficacy 
Administrative orders are useful as specific deterrents, but only in a 
limited class of cases. Where a violator does not realize that the law applies 
to him or does not believe that the agency is serious about requiring com-
pliance with the law, the order may deliver a needed message. Moreover, if a 
source does not understand which specific steps it must take to comply with 
the law, the order may be helpful in spelling out those steps. The order may 
also be helpful if there is judicial enforcement against the violator at a later 
point; a specific order eliminates the defense that the violator did not know 
either that the law applied to him or what action was required for complying 
with the law. While neither of these "defenses" may be cognizable strictly 
according to the law, they do have the potential to sway judges into giving a 
violator a second chance. In effect, the order becomes the first chance, 
making the judicial proceeding the second chance. 
However, use of orders may counteract the general deterrent effect of 
statutes and regulations. If violators realize that the enforcing agency will 
always resort first to orders before turning to more serious enforcement 
methods, they may see no reason to engage in costly compliance activities 
before an order is issued. Issuing orders, rather than resorting to stronger 
enforcement methods, may only delay compliance. Furthermore, because 
administrative orders in themselves carry no clear, specific sanction, a 
facility that ignored the legal requirements of the law in the first place may 
pay no more attention to the administrative order.9i 
90 Court orders can be enforced by civil contempt. In contempt proceedings, the only issues 
that a court considers are whether the order was violated and, as a defense, whether 
compliance was possible. United States v. Ciampitti, 669 F. Supp. 684 (D. N.J. 1987). 
Infeasibility of compliance may be a defense, unless the court considers closing the 
facility as a possible means of compliance. In Commonwealth Dep't ofEnvtl. Resources 
v, Pennsylvania Power Co., 461 Pa. 675, 337 A.2d 823 (1975), the court recognized 
infeasibility of compliance as a defense without considering whether the facility could 
have complied by closing. 
91 A study of enforcement actions against public facilities identified this problem. Gelpe, 
supra note 54, at 102. 
ENFORCEMENT GOALS & METHODS 161 
c) Workability 
Administrative orders are, in theory, relatively easy to issue procedurally, 
so they would be expected to have a high degree of workability. This ease, 
however, is at times illusory. In Israel, especially, issuance of such orders 
may be quite politicized, so the administrative authority may find it quite 
difficult in practice to issue such an order.92 In addition, it may be difficult 
for the agency to draw up specific schedules to include in the order. Some-
times this requires intimate knowledge of the processes operated by the 
facility, of production schedules, etc., and such information is not likely to 
be available within the agency and may be difficult to acquire. If a specific 
schedule is not realistic, it will encourage resistance rather than compliance. 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
Administrative orders, since they are not self-enforcing, do not raise 
problems of procedural fairness, even if they are not issued through formal 
proceedings. An alleged violator who objects to an order can seek immediate 
judicial review, or he can challenge the legality of the orderin a defense to an 
enforcement proceeding." The procedures can be supplied by the courts on 
judicial review. 
Enforcing authorities should, however, extend certain procedural rights 
to those against whom the orders are issued for two reasons. First, substan-
tive fairness demands it because the agency is more likely to make mistakes 
in its requirements, asking for more expensive than necessary compliance 
techniques or imposing unrealistic requirements, if it does not first consult 
with the pollution source. Second, good procedure can protect the order if it 
is later reviewed by a court, either in an administrative action to enforce the 
order or on direct judicial review of the order. A court would be expected to 
give a greater degree of deference to the authority's formulation of require-
ments in the order if the source were given some voice in its formulation. 
92 Issuance of administrative orders regarding air pollution from the refinery and power 
station in the Haifa bay area went through many stages and involved several governmental 
and academic committees. 
93 In the United States, courts generally do not allow immediate judicial review of orders 
under the doctrine of ripeness requiring sources to wait until an agency tries to enforce 
the order. E.g., Southern Pines Assocs. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1990); 
Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989). In Israel, immediate judicial 
review is theoretical,ly available in a petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High 
Court of Justice, although the Court does not always agree to consider such petitions on 
their merits. 
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This is not to suggest that full trial-type procedures must be provided. 
Rather, the alleged violator should be informed of the information in the 
hands of the agency and should be given notice of, and a chance to react to, 
the proposed order. To maintain workability, reasonably tight time limita-
tions should be maintained in these procedures. 
6. Administrative Corrective Actions 
a) Description 
A provision common to many Israeli environmental laws, but rare in the 
American laws, allows the authority responsible for administering a statute 
to step in and cure a violation by itself and then to collect the costs of its 
actions from the violator.94 First, the authority must order the source 
responsible for the violation to remedy it; the authority can step in only if the 
actions required by the order are not executed. In the United States, similar 
authority is found in the Superfund Law for clean-up of contamination at 
hazardous waste disposal sites," and much more limited authority, relating 
only to extreme emergencies, is provided for in other statutes.96 
b) Evaluation - Efficacy 
Administrative corrective actions, if they are used, can have general 
deterrent value. Facilities that are concerned that government will "botch" 
the job and try to charge them with unnecessary costs have an incentive to 
prevent violations that are serious enough for the administrative authority 
to invoke this enforcement method. 
These actions also recapture at least some of the economic gain of a 
violation, since they force the violator to pay for the cure. The cost of the 
cure can even exceed the economic gain from the violation. 
c) Workability 
This remedy is not highly workable for administrative agencies that lack 
the expertise, manpower, or funding to undertake the clean-up. Even if an 
94 E.g., Water Law § 20G(b) (disposal of junk cars); Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § 
13(b) (disposal of waste or construction waste into a public area or littering a public area); 
Abatement of Nuisances Law § llA, 15 L.S.!. 52, 54 (I 960-1961)(relating to stopping 
operation of a car alarm which is causing noise pollution); Abatement of Nuisances Law 
§ lIb (all causes of air, noise, and odor pollution). 
95 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U,S.C.A. 
§§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (West 1995). 
96 Clean Air Act § 303, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (West 1995). 
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agency uses contractors to do the work, oversight is necessary. Moreover, 
the prospect of recovering clean-up costs does not eliminate the need for 
funds for the initial outlay. In the United States, the government finances the 
clean-up from a special superfund, but even these funds have not proven to 
be sufficient, and the government works hard to get the responsible parties 
to do the clean-up without initial government funding. In Israel, the monies 
available from special funds under some of the laws can, in theory, be used, 
but again the adequacy of the funds is likely to be a problem. 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
The use of administrative corrective actions carries a risk of substantive 
unfairness. The government agency may, indeed, spend excessive amounts 
of money on its actions. A source's claim that charging it such excessive 
expenditures is unfair is mitigated if the source responsible for the pollution 
has received prior notice that action is needed and has had the opportunity 
to do the work itself or if an emergency exists. Procedural fairness claims can 
be alleviated by providing the source with procedural rights at the collection 
stage, although to the extent that collection becomes more cumbersome, this 
remedy is less useful for administering agencies. 
7. Withholding Administrative Benefits 
a) Description 
Sometimes violating facilities need something from the enforcing agency. 
They may need benefits associated with the violating facility, such as renewal 
of its operating permit, or benefits associated not with that specific facility 
but with other operations of the same company. Thus, one method of 
enforcement is for the regulating agency to deny such permits or other benefits 
to the violator. 
Several American statutes prohibit the federal government from entering 
into a contract on any matter with a person convicted of criminal violation 
of the statute." Other provisions prohibit granting a construction or operat-
ing permit for a facility if the owner or operator has another facility that is 
violating applicable emission limitations" or impose other limitations on 
97 Clean Air Act § 306, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7606 (West 1995); Clean Water Act § 508, 33 
U.S.C.A. § 1368 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997). 
98 Clean Air Act § 173(a)(3), 42 U.S.CA. § 7503(a)(3)(West 1995). This prohibition applies 
in areas that are already polluted according to the statute's standards. 
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federal provision of financial assistance, contracts, or permits to violating 
activities.99 
Israeli law also provides for withholding administrative benefits from 
those who violate environmental laws. A planning commission, when re-
quested to approve expansion of a facility, can require that equipment in the 
existing facility be upgraded for pollution prevention. 100 Presumably, the 
commission also can require other steps toward the same goal. Under 
Israel's law on oil pollution of the seas, the Port Master can prevent a ship 
from leaving port if a fine regarding that ship has not been paid. 101 
b) Evaluation- Efficacy 
This remedy is likely to work as both a specific and general deterrent, but 
only with regard to those facilities in need of a government benefit. In cases 
where a facility requires a permit that must be renewed periodically, this 
remedy can work quite well.lfpermit renewal is conditioned on compliance, 
the authority could refuse to renew the permit for any violating facility. In 
the United States, such permitting schemes are the norm. In Israel, permits 
are not required under most of the environmental statutes, so this remedy is 
less effective. 102 I! can be of use only if a facility wants to undertake the kind 
of expansion that requires planning approval. 
c) Workability 
This remedy is easy to use if the proper legal framework is in place. The 
agency need only wait for the facility to seek the benefit and then ask that the 
facility demonstrate compliance. If the facility does not need a permit Or the 
99 E.g., Clean Air Act §§ 176,306,42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7506, 7606 (West 1995). Federal rules 
provide for suspension and debarment of a firm as government contractors if that firm 
has been found to have performed poorly on a public contract or to have demonstrated a 
lack of business integrity or competency. A federal official engaged in enforcing these 
regulations reports that they may be applied for environmental violations. Sims, Suspen~ 
sion and Debarment: Potent Government Too/s, 25 Sanreel News No.4, I (Jan./Feb. 
1994). 
100 R. Laster, Israel, in International Encyclopaedia of Laws, Supp. 5 Environmental Law at 
Israel-33 (R. Bianpain ed., 1993). 
10 I Prevention of SeaM Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 28 (1980), 1993 Isr. 
Envtl. Legis. E-2, E-7. 
102 In the United States, both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act require permits for 
all discharges. Permits generally must be renewed every five years. Clean Air Act §§ 
502(b)(5)(B), 503(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7661a(b)(5)(B), 7661b(a) (West 1995); Clean Water 
Act § 402(a), (b), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a), (b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997). 
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benefit is provided by some other agency or authority, workability is more of 
a problem. In the latter case, good communication between different gov-
ernmental authorities is necessary for the remedy to work. 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
Substantive fairness is a problem if the violation is minor and the effect of 
withholding the permit is substantial. Such dis proportionality will rarely 
arise since most minor violations can be corrected at little cost. 
Procedural fairness is more troublesome. The agency determination that a 
violation exists must be made in a trustworthy manner; otherwise, the power 
wielded by an agency over a facility in need of a permit or other benefit may 
be too great. On the other hand, if extensive formal procedures are required, 
workability is lost. 
8. Administrative Penalties 
a) Description 
Several American statutes authorize the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy to impose administrative penalties. These penalties are civil, not criminal, 
in nature. They are not self-enforcing; that is, the agency has no authority to 
collect the penalty without the assistance of a court. In a civil proceeding to 
collect the penalty, the court may review the propriety of the administrative 
decision to impose the penalty and the penalty amount; however, this review 
may be limited in scope. General principles of administrative law require 
that the court defer to the administrative decision. In addition, some envi-
ronmental statutes explicitly dictate that courts defer to the agency decision 
in fixing the penalty or allow judicial review only within a short time-frame. 103 
On the other hand, the agency must use a complicated, trial-type procedure 
in assessing the penalty under such statutes. I" 
The EPA has power to assess administrative penalties under most of its 
major statutory authorizations.lOl One provision of the Clean Air Act 
103 FO>" example, the Clean Air Acl § 113(d)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(d)(r) (West 1995), 
provides that on review, an order should be set aside only jfnot supported by substantial 
evidence in the record or ifit is an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the person to whom 
the administrative order is issued may seek judicial review within thirty days of its 
issuance. Thereafter, it may not be reviewed by any court, including an action to enforce 
the order. 
104 E.g., Clean Air Act § 113(d)(2J. 
105 Clean Air Act §§ 120, 205(c), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7120, 7524 (Wesl 1995); Clean Waler Acl § 
309(g), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
166 TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LAW 
includes explicit instructions on how to set the amount of the penalty in 
order to assure recapture of economic benefits from non-compliance;!06 
other statutory provisions provide more wide-ranging and general instruc-
tions for considering not only economic benefit but also such factors as the 
gravity of the violation, compliance history, and the violator's ability to pay 
the penalty.!07 Other provisions offer even less guidance on how to fix the 
penalty amount. lOS Some statutes specify use of formal proceedings in 
setting penalties,109 while others authorize informal proceedings. 110 
Israeli small criminal fines, discussed above, are comparable to the Amer-
ican administrative penalties in that they may be imposed without the 
involvement of a court, and an administrative agency determines the amount 
of the fine. They differ from the American administrative penalties in that 
the Legal Advisor to the Government, and not the agency charged with 
implementing the law, may impose the fine. More importantly, these fines 
are not really administrative fines in that they bear the stigma and any other 
implications of a determination of criminal guilt. A person who has paid 
such a fine is seen to have admitted his guilt before a court, to have been 
judged guilty, and to have fulfilled his punishment. 
Recent amendments to the Israeli laws on corrective action include provi-
sions that resemble administrative penalties, but only within a very limited 
context and with the amount of the penalty strictly controlled. These laws 
provide that if an authority issues a corrective action order and the responsi-
and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA], 7 U.S. CA. § 1361(a)(West 1980&Supp. 1997); Marine 
Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S,c'A. § 1415(a) (West 1986 & West 
Supp. 1997); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(c) (West 
1995); Toxic Substances Control Act, IS U.S.C.A. § 2619 (West 1982 & West Supp. 
1997). In addition, the environmental agencies in some states hold such authority, and 
others have expressed an interest in acquiring authority to impose administrative penal-
ties. Gelpe, supra note 54, at 84. 
106 Clean Air Act § 120(d). 
107 Clean Air Act § 20S(c)(2); Clean Water Act § 309(g). 
108 The following acts list fewer factors to be considered in setting penalties: Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 26IS(a)(2)(B) (West 1982 & West Supp. 1997); FIFRA, 7 
U.S.C.A. § 136ka)(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1997); Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act contains no listing of 
factors for consideration. 
109 E.g., IS U.S.C.A. § 26IS(a)(2)(A). 
110 Clean Water Act § 309(g)(2)(A) (for penalties not greater than $25,000); Clean Air Act § 
120 (for penalties based on statutorily delineated and relatively technical calculations). 
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ble party does not do as ordered, he can be required to pay twice the amount 
that the authority paid to take the corrective action req\lested. 11I 
One Israeli law does authorize true administrative penalties, but it has 
only very limited potential application to environmental enforcement and 
has not, in fact, been used at all in this area. The Administrative Offenses 
Lawl12 authorizes various ministers to establish by regulations that violations 
of specified laws are administrative violations, and to impose administrative 
penalties. The only environmental law covered by the Law is the Public 
Health Ordinance, 113 which, as its name indicates, deals mainly with health 
issues proper and only incidentally with environmental regulations. Fur-
thermore, the ministers involved have never used their authority to enact 
regulations that make violations of the Public Health Ordinance subject to 
administrative penalties. 
b) Evaluation - Efficacy 
These penalties are similar to civil penalties in terms of how effectively 
they achieve the goals of enforcement. 
c) Workability 
These penalties are somewhat easier for agencies to impose than are civil 
penalties, because the enforcing authorities do not have to turn to the courts. 
This ease is partially offset by the procedures required to the extent that 
formal administrative hearings are used and also by the need for a court 
hearing in order to force payment from a recalcitrant source. Consistent 
with this point, one report suggests that the EP A use its authority to impose 
administrative penalties more frequently under statutes providing flexible 
administrative procedures and less frequently under those requiring the 
agency to use trial-type procedures and to make highly technical findings 
relating to the penalty amount. I I' 
d) Substantive and Procedural Fairness 
Administrative penalties are substantively unfair if they are dispropor-
tional to the violation. To the extent that the statutes provide specific 
III E.g., Maintenance of Cleanliness Law § 13(a)(2). 
112 1986 S.H. 1160 (1985). 
113 !d., app. 
1I4 T, Schoenbaum & R. Rosenberg, Environmental Policy Law: Problems, Cases, and 
Readings 767-70, 1028 (2d ed. 1991). 
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considerations that must form the basis for the penalty amounts and to the 
extent that these considerations are directed at recapture of economic sav-
ings, the problem of disproportion is reduced. 
Procedural fairness can be ensured through trial-type proceedings before 
the agency or via judicial review of the penalty, either through direct judicial 
review or through review when the agency goes to court to collect the 
penalty. To the extent that the court defers to the agency decision, the 
procedural rights (>fthe source are less protected. Again, this is less trouble-
some when the penalty amount is based on fairly technical economic factors. 
However, to work as effective deterrents, the penalty amounts must be 
higher than the economic savings of the non-complying source, and conse-
quently, the amounts must sometimes be very large. 
V. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Both Israeli and U.S. environmental laws provide several different meth-
ods of enforcement. This allows the regulator to suit the enforcement 
method to the needs of a specific case. It is important that regulators be 
allowed such flexibility, and it is, therefore, also important that they have at 
their disposal a range of enforcement tools. If anything, the range of en-
forcement alternatives should be expanded for enforcement ofthose statutes 
that provide only limited enforcement options. The following recommenda-
tions, addressed mainly to changing Israeli law, include suggestions on how 
this range should be expanded. 
If the regulator is to have so many choices, it is imperative that the 
regulator understand in which circumstances each method is best. The 
recommendations below also address the best application of each recom-
mended method of enforcement. 
1. Major Criminal Penalties 
While the environmental laws should provide criminal penalties for viola-
tions, the criminal sanction should not be relied upon as a major enforcement 
method. Such penalties are most appropriate for cases involving real endan-
germent of public health or welfare. Criminal penalties are also appropriate 
for general deterrence where the likelihood of Obtaining criminal prosecu-
tions and convictions is high. This is the case when there is widespread 
agreement on the seriousness ofthe violation. Non-reporting cases are thus 
regarded in the United States, because the American environmental law 
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system relies heavily on self-reporting. Israel. however, does not currently 
have as extensive a self-reporting regime. 
There are those who may support use of criminal penalties because of the 
stigma that these penalties attach to violations. They give environmental 
violations a certain "status." But paper "status" unsupported by actual 
convictions is more likely to encourage disrespect for the law than recognition 
of the importance of compliance. 
2. Small Criminal and Administrative Penalties 
The current Israeli system in regard to such penalties should be retained, 
but with two changes. First, those statutes that impart a "criminal" character 
to such penalties should be changed. The penalties should simply be admin-
istrative. Second, the penalties system should be made applicable to all the 
environmental statutes. Recent amendments to the Israeli laws have partially 
accomplished this second task. 
The use of small administrative penalties for specific deterrence through 
education is a good idea. Similarly, these fines may achieve some general 
deterrence. Neither of these objectives requires use of a criminal sanction. 
There is no need to provide extensive procedural rights for imposition of 
these fines, since they involve no essential stigma or deprivation offreedom. 
Further, small fines involve no sjgnificant deprivation of property. To be 
certain that no objections are raised regarding the absence of procedure, the 
existing system of allowing violators to opt to be sUbjected to a criminal 
procedure should be maintained. When relatively small penalty amounts are 
imposed, it can be expected that few violators will choose to exercise the 
right to go to trial. 
3. Civil Orders 
Israeli courts now have authority under some statutes to issue civil-type 
injunctions, negative and mandatory, to stop pollution and to clean up 
polluted areas, but only within the framework of criminal proceedings. 
There is no reason to tie this authority to a criminal proceeding; if there is a 
need for court orders in such matters, they should be available,even against 
polluters who are not subjected to criminal proceedings. Furthermore, there 
is no need to provide criminal-type protections to the defendant when a 
court is ordering the type of relief it might, in any case, order in a civil 
proceeding brought by a private party. 
The more difficult question is whether giving courts civil order authority 
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would add a remedy of significant importance to the already-available 
authority of the administrative agencies to issue compliance orders. Civil 
orders issued by a court are effective if a court can add another dimension to 
the order that is not provided in an administrative order. A court order adds 
a certain measure of prestige and, therefore, urgency to the order. Court 
prestige may be particularly important in Israel, where the Ministry of the 
Environment still lacks political clout and the Ministry and the local author-
ities are still working to establish a strong record of administrative enforce-
ment. In addition, an agency that turns to the courts to enforce the law may 
free itself of the almost interminable political debates that sometimes ac-
company formulation of administrative orders in Israel. Finally, court 
orders are useful where creative orders would be helpful. Courts can give 
more formalized consideration to the interests of affected third parties. 
4. Civil Penalties 
The major innovation I would suggest is to provide Israeli courts with 
statutory authorization to issue civil penalties. These penalties would be 
distinguished from criminal penalties by their civil nature. They would be 
larger in amount than the administrative penalties discussed in Recommen-
dation 2 above. 
Civil penalties have the potential to become a major enforcement tool. As 
compared to criminal fines, they are easier to impose and therefore should be 
imposed on a greater number of violators. Civil penalties serve the important 
objectives of recapturing benefits obtained from violations and general 
deterrence. Administrative authorities should request, and courts should 
set, penalty amounts at alevel sufficient to recapture these benefits, and they 
should add enough extra penalty for a genuine deterrent effect. 
The major problem presented by civil penalties arises in the realm of 
procedural fairness. There are several possible solutions to this problem. 
One is to provide some of the procedural protections of a criminal trial and 
not others. The specific protections could be set out legislatively, but this 
would be a difficult task, given the difficulty that would be encountered in 
deciding which procedural protections are warranted for all types of cases. A 
second solution would be to adopt the American approach, namely, to leave 
it to the courts to sort out which procedural protections are needed. But this 
is a slow process, sure to take many years, and in the meantime, the validity 
of civil penalties in Israel will be uncertain. If the validity is uncertain, 
ministries and other authorities will hesitate to seek such penalties for fear of 
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wasting resources without securing a positive result, or for fear of making 
bad law in hard cases. In addition, courts unsure of the procedural issue will 
hesitate to impose substantial penalties. So the real advantage of this poten-
tially important enforcement tool will not be realized for many years. 
Moreover, if the courts in Israel, unlike those in the United States, find it 
necessary to encumber the granting of civil penalties with heavy procedural 
requirements, the utility of this enforcement tool will be diminished. 
A third, and preferable, alternative is to use the procedure already estab-
lished in the Israeli laws for small criminal penalties, namely, to give an 
alleged violator the option of having criminal proceedings instead of civil 
penalty proceedings brought against him. In this way, the violator will be 
guaranteed full procedural rights. While this route will expose the violator to 
the risks of opprobrium of a criminal determination, a possibly higher fine, 
and to the penalty of imprisonment, the violator can hardly object. The 
violator will then receive all the procedural rights granted in a criminal 
proceeding, rights that are designed to provide the appropriate degree of 
protection against these risks. 
One might ask whether this solution will eliminate civil penalties as a 
realistic option because alleged violators will always opt for the procedural 
protections of a criminal proceeding. This is an empirical question about 
expected behavior. There seems to be little basis for assuming that this will, 
indeed, be the case, unless the State seeks extremely harsh civil penalties. 
Most alleged violators cannot be expected to prefer the stigma of a criminal 
adjudication and the risk, however remote, of incarceration. 
This solution should have the salntary effect of deterring public enforce-
ment authorities from asking for extremely harsh civil penalties. Mann has 
noted that in some cases, imposition of a civil penalty may cause greater 
hardship to a violator than would imposition of a criminal penalty, and this 
is unjust if the civil penalty is imposed without the procedural protections of 
a criminal trial. I 15 The suggested option of the criminal sanction would not 
only deter the authority from creating such a situation by seeking a harsh 
civil penalty, but would also give the aIJeged violator a voice in determining 
which type of penalty is harder to bear. Mann correctly points out that this is 
a sUbjective judgment and that this solution gives voice to that subjective 
judgment. 
115 Mann, supra note 1, at 257-58. 
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For this solution to work, one innovation is necessary. At the beginning of 
the civil penalty proceeding, the potential liability of the alleged violator 
should not be open-ended. The statute or statutes authorizing civil penalties 
should set a maximum amount and should specify that in the complaint for a 
specific case, the enforcing public authority should ask for a specific penalty. 
The court in a civil proceeding should not be permitted to impose a higher 
penalty unless it finds good cause in facts not available to the agency at the 
time of filing the complaint, or else it finds that the agency request was 
unconscionably low. The amount requested by the authority in the civil 
proceeding would have no influence on the amount of a potential fine in a 
criminal proceeding, should the defendant choose that route.116 
5. Administrative Orders 
Administrative orders are helpful for achieving three objectives: (I) to get 
the attention of a source, particularly a small facility, not familiar with the 
requirements imposed by environmental laws; (2) to give a source technical 
assistance in determining what it must do to comply with the law; and (3) to 
prevent the alleged violator from later claiming, either honestly or disingen-
uously, in a civil or criminal enforcement action before a court that it did not 
know what the law required. To deal with these circumstances, the Israeli 
Ministry of the Environment, or other ministries and public authorities 
charged with enforcing environmental laws, should have authority to issue 
administrative enforcement orders that include orders to cease pollution, to 
prevent renewed pollution, and to clean up and restore polluted areas. The 
law should state that orders should include specific requirements and timet-
ables. Such detailed authority now exists under some of the environmental 
laws, such as the Water Law,ll7 but not under others. 
Formulation of complex orders that include specific requirements and 
timetables will place a heavier burden on the agencies, but issuance of more 
general orders requiring only compliance with the law in broad terms is 
116 This rejects the approach found in the current law on oil pollution of the sea, which 
prohibits the court in a criminal proceeding from setting a fine lower than that requested 
by the agency, unless the accused proves special conditions that justify a lower fine. 
Prevention of Sea-Water Pollution by Oil Ordinance (New Version) § 27(b). 
117 The authority to issue these orders under the Water Law is held by the Water Commis-
sioner and not by the Minister of the Environment. Water Law § 20E, G, H. It would be 
preferable to transfer the authority to the Minister, but this is not the subject of the 
present analysis. 
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likely to accomplish little. In cases where it is only necessary to get the 
attention of a small facility, a letter, rather than a formal administrative 
order, would be sufficient. Other justifications for administrative orders all 
require that they be detailed. 
An agency that issues administrative orders can reduce the drain on its 
reSOurces and alleviate the problem of its limited information regarding 
which steps should be specified in the order by requiring the source of the 
pollution to propose the specifics of the order, along with a detailed written 
justification for the proposed order. This has proven to be quite successful in 
some cases in the United States, where there is an active industry of pollution 
control specialists ready to develop such proposed orders as consultants to 
violating sources. Although consultants will try to reduce the costs to their 
clients, they also are motivated not to devise proposals that are "too soft" on 
the violators. The consultants must satisfy the regulatory authorities; if they 
do not, the work will have to be redone, the client will be unhappy, and other 
sources will not seek their services in the future. 
To the greatest extent possible, orders should include multi-step time-
tables. Failure to meet the requirements of any step of an order should be 
deemed a violation of the order. This allows the administering authority to 
detect problems early on. For example, if the final requirements of an order 
were to come into effect at the end ofthree years and no intermediate steps or 
timetable had been specified in the order, then the authority might discover 
only at the end of the three-year period that even initial steps toward 
compliance had not been taken. Furthermore, the authority would almost 
certainly have to wait until the end of the three years to take any action 
regarding the non-compliance. With a set timetable specified in the order, 
the authority would be more likely to know that the source is not on schedule 
in correcting the problem, and it could take legal action against the source 
without delay. For the same reason, orders should also include self-reporting 
requirements to facilitate tracking compliance. 
Administrative orders are also useful if accompanied by either a carrot or 
a stick that makes them self-enforcing. Orders issued as conditions attached 
to expansion permits or funding grants provide a carrot. The permit or grant 
would provide that the document is effective only if the violator first meets 
the requirements of an attached administrative order. Orders that specify 
civil penalties that the agency will seek for non-compliance have sticks. 
There should be a penalty specified for each individual action required by 
the order and for each violation of the specified timetable. 
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Fairness issues should be handled by giving the affected facility some 
voice in the formulation of the order. This can be achieved by providing 
prior notice and an opportunity to raise objections either in writing or in an 
informal conference. 
Administrative agencies should not issue orders such as sewage moratoria 
with direct effects on third parties. To preserve the substantive and procedur-
al rights of third parties, only courts should issue such orders. 
6. Administrative Corrective Actions 
Israeli laws currently authorizing agencies to take the steps needed to stop, 
prevent, and clean up pollution should be retained, and such authority 
should be added to all the environmental laws. This remedy is, however, of 
only limited utility. It is most effective for dealing with emergency situations 
and only where some designated source of interim funding is available. 
Administrative authorities should always try to provide prior notice and 
opportunity to conduct the clean-up and to consult on the work plan to the 
alleged source of the pollution. 
7. Administrative Penalties 
Although the Israeli Ministry of the Environment, or any other authorities 
charged with enforcing environmental laws, should be authorized to impose 
small administrative penalties, the American model of using large adminis-
trative fines should not be adopted. Large administrative penalties are of 
limited utility. Most American laws allow their imposition only through 
highly formal administrative proceedings, so it is not easy for agencies to 
impose the penalties. If ministries and other authorities in Israel are given 
the option of going to court for a civil penalty, they will have an alternative 
method of collecting penalties that is not much more burdensome than 
administrative proceedings. In fact, because administrative penalties are not 
self-enforcing, resort to court may be needed in any event. Because of the 
differences between the Israeli and American political systems, Israeli gov-
ernment ministries tend to be more politically charged than the American 
environmental agencies, and it is questionable as to whether they can use 
direct administrative order authority in an efficient and even-handed manner. 
Finally, since enough changes in the law have been suggested here, there is 
no need to add this, the most dubious and potentially most drastic change. 
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8. Consistency among Enforcement Methods 
To the greatest extent possible, enforcement provisions for all statutes 
should be identical. Not only would this avoid senseless differences between 
the statutes, but it also would reduce the possibility of wasting resources in 
seeking judicial interpretation of the differences. It would allow reliance on 
cases that arose through enforcement actions under one statute as precedents 
for cases concerning violations of other statutes. With identical enforcement 
provisions, it would be easier for personnel in both the ministries and the 
local authorities to learn and understand their enforcement powers, and it 
would enable citizens to understand what they may expect of the authorities 
that are supposed to protect them from violators. In addition, it would be 
easier for sources subject to regulatory requirements under several different 
statutes to understand the enforcement sanctions to which they may be 
subject. This understanding is essential if the laws are to have a deterrent 
effect and also for fairness. "' The changes introduced by a 1997 law are a 
positive step in this direction,Il9 
To accomplish the goal of identifying enforcement methods, it would be 
optimal to enact one law on uniform enforcement of environmental statutes, 
rather than separate enforcement provisions appearing in each statute. Such 
exceptions and special provisions as are needed could be included in the 
specific laws. A second best option is to insert identical enforcement provi-
sions in the various environmental statutes. 
9. Special Funds for Penalties 
In addition to the changes recommended for Israeli law, I propose one 
recommendation for a change in U.S. law. Many Israeli laws provide that 
monetary penalties be paid into special funds that can be used for cleaning 
up the environment. The closest thing to a similar provision in American law 
is found in the Clean Air Act, which allows payment of some civil penalties 
assessed under that statute into a special fund to be used to finance "air 
compliance and enforcement activities. "120 This provision is much more 
118 This may not be a major problem in the American federal laws because the federal 
regulator, the Environmental Protection Agency, concerns itself mainly with violations 
by large companies. These large companies may have as advisors lawyers who specialize 
in one or two of the environmental laws. 
119 Environmental Quality Law [Methods of Punishment] (Amendment of Statutes]. 
120 Clean Air Act § 304(g)(I), 42 U.S.c. § 7604(g)(I) (West 1995). 
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limited than the Israeli provisions. It applies only to actions under one 
statute, and even within the framework of that statute, it applies only to 
enforcement actions brought by citizens and not to those brought by the 
federal government. Furthermore, it is restrictive in terms of the purposes 
for which the funds may be used, for example, not allowing their use for 
clean-up. American lawmakers should contemplate more extensive use of 
special environmental funds. 
